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When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against
Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup*
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Act)1 requires the cleanup of aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste sites. The Act imposes liability for
cleanup costs on three broadly defined classes of persons connected to
waste disposal: site owners or operators, 2 generators,3 and transporters.4
Because of the tremendous cost of hazardous waste cleanup,5 the judicial
trend has been to extend liability to parties whose connection to waste
disposal may be less than obvious.6
Lending institutions are the most recent group to face CERCLA
liability. A lender that forecloses on and takes title to property held as
security for its loan may be liable for cleaning up hazardous wastes7 de-
* This Note won first prize in the Natural Resources Section Student Writing
Competition sponsored by the American Bar Association.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9601-9657 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987)).
2. CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(l)-(2) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
3. Id. § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3).
4. Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4).
5. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that the aver-
age expenditure per CERCLA site is roughly $12 million. See Amendment to National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan: The National Priorities List, 49 Fed. Reg.
40,320, 40,325 (1984). Total cost estimates for hazardous waste cleanup vary greatly due to
the uncertainty of the number of sites. EPA projections show that the cost of remedying 1800
of the most threatening sites will require an expenditure of $23 bil lion. See EPA OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ExTENT OF THE HAZARDOUS RELEASE PROB-
LEM AND FUTURE FUNDING NEEDS CERCLA § 301 (A)(1)(C) STUDY, FINAL REPORT (Dec.
1984). The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimates that cleaning up the
10,000 existing CERCLA sites could cost $100 billion and require 50 years to accomplish. See
CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUPERFUND STRATEGY 3 (1985).
6. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1985)
(current site owner responsible for cleanup of wastes disposed of by previous owner); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,895,
20,897 (D.S.C. Aug. 28, 1984) (sublessor liable for hazardous waste disposal caused by subles-
see); United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698, 20,698-99
(D.S.C. June 15, 1984) (defendant may be liable when it acted as "conduit" in transfer of
CERCLA property and held title for one hour); United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616, 20,616 (D.N.M. May 4, 1984) (lessor liable for disposal activities
of lessee); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 849 (W.D.
Mo. 1984) (vice president and major shareholder responsible for wastes disposed by
corporation).
7. This Note uses the terms "hazardous waste," "hazardous substance," and "toxic
waste" interchangeably. CERCLA refers only to "hazardous substance." See CERCLA
§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
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posited by the borrower. Because landowners are strictly liable under
CERCLA, 8 a lender that becomes an owner cannot avoid liability by
disclaiming knowledge of or involvement in the borrower's disposal ac-
tivities.9 Thus, a foreclosing lender may be exposed to liabilities beyond
the value of its loan or its security. Secured lenders dispute this result,
relying on a provision in CERCLA that expressly excludes a party "who,
without participating in the management of a [waste disposal site], holds
indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest."'0 They
maintain that this exculpatory language protects their actions in foreclos-
ing, even when it leads to actual ownership.
Courts have disagreed over whether CERCLA's security interest ex-
emption insulates a lender that succeeds in title to property to satisfy a
secured debt." With 378,000 potential CERCLA sites in this country
today12 and millions of tons of industrial wastes produced each year,' 3
exposing lenders to cleanup costs would have far-reaching implications
for commercial lenders and those seeking their services. The immediate
effect of such a rule likely would be to discourage lenders from foreclos-
ing when the cleanup costs exceed the value of the security.14
This straightforward cost-benefit analysis is complicated by con-
8. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding
that CERCLA imposes strict liability on the current property owner without regard to causa-
tion); see also United States v. Cauffman, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,161, 20,162
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1984) (causation is not required to establish liability of site owner or
operator).
9. A CERCLA defendant can avoid liability to the extent that it can invoke one of the
three affirmative defenses listed in § 107(b). See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
10. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis ad-
ded); see infra text accompanying note 73.
11. Compare United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,996
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (lender taking title not liable for borrower's hazardous cleanup obliga-
tions) and In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(dictum) (had lender repossessed its collateral lender would not be liable) with United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D. Md. 1986) (lender taking title liable
for cost of removing hazardous wastes deposited by borrower). See generally Murphy, The
Impact of "Superfund" and Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Invest-
ment Activities, 41 Bus. LAW. 1133, 1138-45 (1986); Comment, Fear of Foreclosure: United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,165 (July 1986).
12. Superfund: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tour-
ism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1985) (statement of
Milton J. Socolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office).
13. 43 million metric tons were produced in 1981 alone. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT (1982), reprinted in F. GRAD., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 4.04, at 640 (3d ed. 1985).
14. This statement is an oversimplification of the problem. For example, a secured party
could foreclose and hope that a third-party bid is received at the foreclosure sale that is suffi-
cient to satisfy the debt in default. Because the new owner may also be liable under CERCLA,
it is highly speculative whether the secured party would be able to recoup its loss. See Steptoe,
Chemical Waste Complicates Many Land Sales, Financings, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1986, at 39,
col. 1.
[Vol. 38
straints on a lender's ability to discover hazardous wastes on the property
prior to foreclosure. A secured creditor enjoys protection from CER-
CLA liability only to the extent that it does not "participate in the man-
agement" of the security property.15 Therefore, a lender may be liable if
it attempts to monitor the condition of the property prior to foreclosure.
This construction forces a lender to walk a narrow path: it must know of
potentially hazardous conditions, but must not become so involved that
it forfeits the exemption and incurs liability.
This Note examines the dispute over lender liability under CER-
CLA. Section I provides an overview of CERCLA provisions that affect
a lender's responsibility for its borrower's waste disposal obligations.
Section II reviews general real estate financing principles and their poten-
tial for conflict under CERCLA. Section III surveys the court decisions
that address the issue of lender liability and compares the alternative
constructions of the security interest exemption adopted by the courts
and the conflicting results they yield. Section IV evaluates lender liabil-
ity in light of Congress' intentions for hazardous waste cleanup. This
Note concludes, after reviewing CERCLA's history and structure, that a
lender succeeding in title to its security property is a proper CERCLA
defendant. It also proposes that the statute should be interpreted to al-
low lenders to police their security interests without incurring liability.
This proposal preserves the remedy of foreclosure and encourages safer
hazardous waste disposal practices.
I. CERCLA Overview
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to close the gaps in federal haz-
ardous waste laws.16 The Act, adopted during the final days of the
ninety-sixth Congress, authorizes the federal government to respond to
actual or threatened releases of hazardous substances. Because of the
haste with which CERCLA was enacted, little legislative history exists to
guide the courts in interpreting its provisions.1 7 Indeed, Congress delib-
15. See United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, 20,997 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (lender may be liable if "overly entangled"); see infra notes 98-111 and
accompanying text.
16. In 1976, Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to
provide "cradle-to-grave" regulation of hazardous substances. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982)). The RCRA regulatory scheme ap-
plies only to operating waste disposal facilities; CERCLA provides for clean up of abandoned
or inactive facilities. The potential interaction between RCRA and foreclosure is beyond the
scope of this Note.
17. CERCLA was approved by a lame-duck Congress just prior to the inauguration of a
new administration. The legislation was adopted under a suspension of the rules that pre-
cluded amendments. No conference was held on the measure, and no report was issued on the
statute as enacted. One exasperated court complained: "CERCLA [is] a hastily drawn piece of
compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions." United States
v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984); see also
August 1987] CLAIMS AGAINST LENDERS
erately left politically sensitive issues relating to liability for the courts to
resolve using common law principles.' 8 Thus, from the outset, the judi-
ciary has played a central role in shaping federal hazardous waste laws.
Congress affirmed this role when it reauthorized CERCLA in late 1986
without making major revisions in the law as developed by the courts.19
CERCLA expressly provides for two mechanisms for hazardous
waste cleanup. The President can order "potentially responsible parties"
to undertake remedial measures at a hazardous waste site. 20 Alterna-
tively, the government can take immediate action, "response action," to
remedy the problem and later sue for recovery of its expenses from the
responsible parties. 21
To finance government response action, CERCLA created the fed-
eral "Superfund. ' ' 22 A special tax on chemical and petroleum producers
and general tax revenues provided the initial monies for Superfund.23 To
Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United
States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983). For a review of CERCLA's legislative
history, see Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Com-
pensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1982).
18. For example, CERCLA does not specify what standard of liability is to be applied.
See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. The Act is also silent on whether liability is joint
and several and whether a defendant has a right to contribution. See infra notes 52-57 and
accompanying text. Congress intended that these issues be resolved by the courts. As Senator
Randolph, sponsor of CERCLA, stated:
It is intended that issues of liability not resolved by this act, if any, shall be governed
by traditional and evolving principles of common law. An example is joint and several
liability. Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and the liability of joint
tort-feasors will be determined under common or previous statutory law.
126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980) (emphasis added).
19. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
20. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a) (West Supp. 1987). Section 106(a) autho-
rizes the President to order an abatement of a hazardous condition that poses "an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment." This au-
thority has been delegated to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. See
Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1982), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. 11983).
21. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1987). To recover its re-
sponse costs, the government must prove that:
(1) the site is a "facility";
(2) a "release" or "threatened release" of any "hazardous substance" from the site
has occurred;
(3) the release or threatened release has caused the federal government to incur "re-
sponse costs"; and
(4) the defendant is one of the persons designated as a party liable for costs.
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md. 1986); United
States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
22. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507(a) (West Supp. 1987).
23. Of the initial $1.6 billion Superfund monies approved in 1980, 87.5% came from
special taxes on petroleum and certain chemicals, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 46114612, 4661-4662
(1982), and 12.5% came from general revenue appropriations, see 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2)
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replenish the fund, the Act provides that the government may seek re-
covery from "responsible parties" under the meaning of the statute.24
Thus, absent an infusion of appropriated funds, the pace of federal
cleanup efforts depends upon the government's success in recovering its
costs from those responsible for creating hazardous waste problems.
Primary responsibility for conducting Superfund-financed cleanup
actions rests in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).25 To carry
out this responsibility, the EPA ranks potential cleanup sites on the Na-
tional Priorities List according to the threat they pose to the public
health and environment.26 Although the EPA has primary responsibility,
state and local governments may also tap Superfund to finance their own
cleanup efforts.27
In addition to presidential orders and government response actions,
CERCLA has indirectly created other hazardous waste cleanup mecha-
nisms. The Act has encouraged private party cleanup participation. It
has been interpreted as creating a new cause of action for private parties
who voluntarily undertake hazardous waste cleanups, by allowing pri-
vate cost recoveries against "potentially responsible parties" or
Superfund.28 CERCLA has also encouraged state government participa-
tion by providing a model after which virtually all states have enacted
their own superfund programs.29
A. Potentially Responsible Parties
CERCLA identifies four classes of potential defendants: (1) current
owners and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities; (2) owners
and operators of such facilities at the time of the waste disposal; (3) haz-
ardous waste generators that arranged for disposal of their wastes at the
(1982) (current version at 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507(a) (West Supp. 1987)). The Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act authorizes a $8.5 billion replenishment. See infra note 169.
24. The Act defines four classes of liable persons. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(a) (West Supp. 1987); see infra note 30.
25. Section 104(a) expressly delegates cleanup authority to the President. CERCLA
§ 104(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a) (West Supp. 1987). The EPA has been given primary respon-
sibility for carrying out this function. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1982), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 (Supp. I 1983).
26. See id. § 105(a)(8)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (West Supp. 1987); National Oil
and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. B, at 815
(1986).
27. CERCLA § 104(d), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(d) (West 1986 & Supp. 1987).
28. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1987); see gener-
ally Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 141 (1986); Comment, Private Right of Action to Recover Cleanup Costs From
Superfund, 49 ALB. L. REv. 616 (1985).
29. All but ten states have enacted legislation that parallels CERCLA. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1984). States that have not enacted their
own superfund programs are Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
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facility; and (4) transporters of the hazardous substances for disposal at
the facility selected by them.30 A waste disposal "facility" is given an
extremely broad definition: it includes any fixture, equipment, or real
property used to store hazardous wastes. 31
The first wave of CERCLA litigation focused on the liability of toxic
waste generators. 32 More recently, attention has shifted to landowners
because federal authorities have urged an expansive reading of CERCLA
liability.33 Four classes of landowners may be liable. Current owners of
CERCLA sites, as well as those that owned such sites at the time of the
waste disposal, are liable under section 107(a). The section 101(20)(A)
definition of "owner" also includes any former owner whose interest in a
property was conveyed to the government as a result of bankruptcy, fore-
closure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means.34 Finally, a
landowner who transfers ownership of property without disclosing the
existence of a hazardous waste condition is liable under section
30. Section 107(a) creates four classes of liable persons:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or site selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1987).
31. Section 101(9) defines the term "facility" to mean:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft,
or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, dis-
posed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West Supp. 1987). Section 101(9) has been interpreted broadly. See,
e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 296 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (drag strip on
which contaminated oil had been applied held to be a "facility" for CERCLA purposes).
32. See Comment, CERCLA Litigation Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liabil-
ity, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,224 (June 1984).
33. See Comment, CERCLA 1985: A Litigation Update, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,395 (Dec. 1985).
34. Section 101(20)(A) defines "owner or operator" to include:
(iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bank-
ruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of
State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled
activities at such facility immediately beforehand.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A)(iii) (West Supp. 1987).
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101(35)(C).35 Liability lies even when the transferor did not create the
hazard, but was aware of its existence.
B. Standard of Liability
Defendants are strictly liable under CERCLA. Courts have reached
this conclusion even though Congress deleted language prescribing strict
liability as it hurried to adopt the legislation. Courts have noted that
CERCLA language and history strongly suggest that liability is imposed
without fault.3 6 Thus, a party is liable if it falls within one of the classes
of culpable parties identified in section 107(a), unless it can invoke one of
the affirmative defenses set forth in section 107(b).37 Congress tacitly
approved this scheme in 1986 when it reauthorized CERCLA without
changing the standard of liability.
At least one court has imposed CERCLA liability without requiring
proof of causation between the defendant's actions and the hazardous
waste dumping. In New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,38 the Second Circuit
rejected the defendant's claim that causation was an element of CER-
CLA liability, at least in the context of landowner liability. The court
concluded that requiring causation would make "superfluous" one of the
affirmative defenses provided under the Act, and would "open a huge
loophole" in CERCLA's scheme of liability.39 The court's explanation is
illustrative of the judiciary's broad reading of CERCLA liability:
It is quite clear that if the current owner of a site could avoid liability
merely by having purchased the site after chemical dumping had
ceased, waste sites certainly would be sold, following the cessation of
dumping, to new owners who could avoid the liability otherwise re-
quired by CERCLA. Congress had well in mind that persons who
dump or store hazardous waste sometimes cannot be located or may be
deceased or judgment-proof. We will not interpret section 9607(a)
[section 107(a)] in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's
35. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987). See infra
note 47 and accompanying text.
36. Representative Florio, the sponsor of CERCLA, explained: "Liability [is] 'subject
only to the defenses' provided in the bill.... Thus, the absence of negligence is not a defense
to liability." 126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (1980).
Section 101(32) requires that liability be construed in the same way it is under § 311 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (The Clean Water Act). See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
Courts have previously construed § 311 to impose strict liability. See United States v. Le
Beouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981);
Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
This standard has been applied to CERCLA. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Congress intended that responsible parties be held strictly
liable"); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo.
1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 804-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
37. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
38. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
39. Id. at 1044-45.
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goals, in the absence of a specific congressional intention otherwise.4°
Under Shore Realty, the current owner of real property containing
hazardous materials is liable for removal and remedial costs even if it
neither owned the siteat the time of disposal nor caused the waste to be
placed there. The defendant, however, can raise the affirmative defense
that the disposal was caused solely by a third party. This defense is one
of three expressly provided by CERCLA, discussed in the following
section.
C. Affirmative Defenses
Section 107(b) enumerates three defenses available to persons falling
within CERCLA's broad liability provisions. The section exculpates an
otherwise liable party who can show that the release or threat of hazard-
ous substances and the resulting damages were due solely to acts of God,
war, or an unrelated third party.41 The few courts that have been
presented with section 107(b) defenses have construed the statute very
narrowly. Support for a narrow construction is found in the statute's
stringent conditions, which include requiring the defendant to show "by
a preponderance of the evidence" that the hazardous condition was
"caused solely" by one or more of the three enumerated forces.42
The third-party defense is the most important of the three atffrma-
tive defenses. It is limited, however, by definitional requirements. The
defense requires that the third party be someone "other than an em-
ployee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission oc-
curs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or
indirectly, with the defendant. '43 In addition, the defendant must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it exercised due care with respect
to the hazardous substances and took precautions against the foreseeable
acts or omissions of others.44
In the context of successor landowner liability, the Second Circuit
ruled in Shore Realty that the third-party defense is available only when
the hazardous substances were dumped during the defendant's owner-
40. Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).
41. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West Supp. 1987).
42. An "act of war" is not defined in the statute; however, an "act of God" is narrowly
defined to mean "an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been
prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." CERCLA § 101(1), 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(l) (West Supp. 1987).
43. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis ad-
ded); see United States v. Argent Corp., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,616, 20,616
(D.N.M. May 4, 1984) (lessor held to be contractually related to lessee); United States v. South
Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,272, 20,275 (D.S.C.
Feb. 23, 1984) (site owner held to be contractually related to generator).
44. CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3) (West Supp. 1987).
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ship or operation of the property.45 The decision had the effect of placing
the third-party defense largely beyond the reach of successor landown-
ers. In response, Congress introduced a definition of "contractual rela-
tionship" that relieves persons who unknowingly acquire property that
contains hazardous wastes. This "innocent landowner" defense is ex-
tremely limited in scope: the defendant must show that it had neither
actual nor constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition at the time
it acquired the property.46 Furthermore, the defendant is under an af-
firmative duty to inquire into the previous ownership and uses of the
property. In judging the reasonableness of the defendant's investigation,
CERCLA expressly requires the courts to consider any specialized
knowledge or experience possessed by the defendant. Finally, a person
who discovers a toxic condition after acquiring the property may be lia-
ble in the event the property is transferred without disclosing the
defect.47
D. Scope of Liability
Liability under CERCLA can be enormous. Responsible parties are
liable for all removal or remedial costs, plus interest.48 Responsible par-
ties are also liable for up to fifty million dollars for damages to natural
resources. 49 No ceiling on liability exists when the release or threatened
45. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1985). But see United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985)
(holding third-party defense may be available to current landowner for wastes disposed of by
prior owner). See infra note 84. See generally Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The
Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate Transactions, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,017 (Jan. 1984); Cyphert & Key, Hazardous Waste Facility Successor Liability: The
Ultimate in Guilt by Association, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1985, at 18; Moskowitz & Hoyt, En-
forcement of CERCLA Against Innocent Owners of Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 1171
(1986); Note, Hazardous Wastes and the Innocent Purchaser, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 253 (1986).
46. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1987).
The third party defense is also available to persons who acquire hazardous waste property
by inheritance or bequest. Id. § 101(35)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(A)(iii) (West Supp.
1987). To claim the defense, the defendant must show that it exercised reasonable care with
regard to the hazardous substances, and took precautions against the acts or omissions of third
parties. Id. § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b)(3).
47. Section 101(35)(C) states:
[I]f the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance at such facility when the defendant owned the real property and
then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another person without
disclosing such knowledge, such defendant shall be treated as liable under section
9607(a)(l) [107(a)(1)] and no defense under section 9607(b)(3) [107(b)(3)] shall be
available to such defendant.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
48. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West Supp. 1987) (recovery of interest on
expenses incurred added by amendment in 1986).
49. Id. § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(C); see also id. § 107(c)(l)(D), 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(l)(D).
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release of hazardous substances results from willful misconduct, or fail-
ure on the part of the disposer to cooperate in the cleanup. Once a court
has ordered an abatement action,50 failure to comply may result in a pen-
alty of up to $25,000 per violation and fines of up to $25,000 per day of
noncompliance.5 1
CERCLA is silent about whether liability may be joint and several.
Early versions of the legislation provided that joint tortfeasors be jointly
and severally liable for the harm caused. Language to this effect was de-
leted, however, prior to CERCLA's enactment. Nonetheless, courts
have interpreted the Act to grant them the discretionary power to impose
joint and several liability.52 This interpretation allows the government to
collect its total cleanup expenses from one responsible party, thereby re-
lieving it of the burden of suing all potentially responsible parties. More-
over, the threat of full liability provides a powerful incentive for small
contributors to a waste site to negotiate a settlement with the govern-
ment.5 3 Congress affirmed this approach when it reauthorized CERCLA
in 1986. 54
When Congress deleted reference to joint and several liability from
the compromise CERCLA legislation prior to its enactment, it also
struck specific provisions extending a right of contribution to defendants.
The courts, again examining the legislative history and language of the
statute as enacted, concluded that federal common law provided a right
to contribution. 55 Therefore, a defendant held jointly and severally liable
50. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
51. Id. § 109(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(a)-(b) (Congress increased the maximum pen-
alty in 1986 from $10,000 to $25,000 per day).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844
(W.D. Mo. 1984) ("joint and several liability is at least permissible, if not mandated, under the
facts"); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (de-
fendants are jointly and severally liable consistent with common law); see also Note, Joint and
Several Liability For Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1982)
(concluding that federal courts have authority to impose joint and several liability under mod-
em common law).
53. See Light, A Defense Counsel's Perspective on Superfund, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,203, 10,206 n.20 (1985) (government complaints invariably allege joint and several
liability); see generally Casenote, Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund: The Plight of
the Small Volume Hazardous Waste Contributor, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1057 (1985).
54. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. S14,903 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford)
(express provision not necessary "given the clear and correct body of case law that has con-
firmed and developed the doctrine of strict, joint and several liability under [CERCLA]"); 131
CONG. REC. H 11,070 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("where appropriate,
liability under CERCLA is... joint and several, as a matter of Federal common law").
55. See, e.g., Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
(contribution allowed among joint tortfeasors); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp.
1484, 1489-92 (D. Colo. 1985) ("Congress intended issues of liability, including... contribu-
tion, to be determined under traditional and evolving principles of federal common law"). For
a general discussion of the right to contribution under CERCLA, see Comment, Apportion-
ment and Contribution Under the "Superfund" Act, 53 UMKC L. REV. 594 (1985); Note, A
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
is entitled to seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties.
A defendant may not seek contribution, however, when it has knowingly
and willfully participated in an illegal dumping of hazardous waste.5 6
The right of contribution was recently codified in the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986.57
II. Lender Liability Under CERCLA
Liability for hazardous waste cleanup under CERCLA is closely
linked to landownership.58 Lenders may become landowners when they
acquire real property held as security for a debt under current lending
practices. To understand fully lender liability under CERCLA, it is nec-
essary to review briefly some of the basic features of commercial lending
law.
To finance the purchase of real property, a buyer typically borrows
some portion of the purchase price from a commercial lender59 that, in
turn, secures the debt by taking a security interest in the real estate. This
process involves the transfer of a real property interest 60 by the bor-
rower61 to the lender, 62 to be held as security for the payment of the debt.
Similarly, a landowner can obtain credit for other purposes by borrowing
against the value of its existing real property holdings.
Various types of financing instruments are utilized by lenders and
Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal Common Law, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 668 (1986).
56. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 910-11 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
57. CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f) (West Supp. 1987).
58. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
59. Commercial banks, savings and loans associations, and mutual savings banks are
common commercial lenders. Other real estate creditors include life insurance companies,
pension funds, real estate investment trusts and, of course, real property sellers.
60. Three conceptual theories have been advanced to explain the nature of the interest
taken by the mortgagee. At common law, a mortgagee held legal "title" to the mortgaged
property until the obligation has been satisfied. This "title" was somewhat illusory: the mort-
gagor was treated as the owner of the property. The legal significance of the mortgagee's "ti-
tle" arose only in disputes between the parties to the mortgage and their successors. See G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.1, at 142-45 (2d ed. 1985); W.
WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES § 5, at 26 (1934). A minority of states, primarily in the
East, adhere to this position.
The prevailing view today is to treat the mortgage as conferring to the mortgagee a lien on
the mortgaged property, not legal title. The lien theory has the advantage of describing more
accurately the limited nature of the mortgagee's security interest. See G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra, § 4.2, at 145-49. A few states have adopted a compromise position between
the title and lien theories. This intermediate theory holds that the mortgage creates a security
interest by which the mortgagee's right to possession accrues on default of the mortgage debt.
See id., § 1.5, at 10-11, § 4.3, at 149-51.
61. This Note will use interchangeably the terms "borrower," "debtor," and
"mortgagor."
62. This Note will use interchangeably the terms "lender," "creditor," and "mortgagee."
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landowners. The mortgage is the most common form of real estate fi-
nancing in this country. If the borrower defaults on the mortgage loan,
the lender may proceed against the borrower personally. More com-
monly, the lender will choose to foreclose the mortgage.63 Some states
even require the lender to exhaust the security by foreclosure before the
lender can take other legal steps to collect the debt.64 While the proceed-
ings for foreclosure vary greatly by jurisdiction, central to all is the sale
of the security to satisfy the unpaid debt.
Many states also offer a tripartite lending device, known as a deed of
trust, by which a landowner-borrower conveys the realty to a third party
in trust to hold as security for the underlying obligation to the lender. 65
Deeds of trust generally authorize the third party trustee to sell the prop-
erty through a private trustee's sale in the event of a default. The advan-
tage of the deed of trust is that the trustee's sale avoids both the time and
expense of a judicial proceeding.66
At the sale of security property, the lender is entitled to receive as
much of the sale proceeds as is necessary to satisfy the unpaid debt. It is
therefore common practice for the lender to bid up to that amount.67 If a
third party makes a higher bid, that party receives the title to the prop-
erty and the lender is made whole by the sale proceeds. Alternatively, if
the lender makes the highest bid, it takes title to the property. When
practical, the lender can attempt to recoup its loss on the bad debt by
holding the property until it can be sold for at least the value of the debt.
For example, if the property is worth less than the outstanding debt that
it secured, the lender can wait for the property to appreciate before sell-
ing it. In this way, lending institutions often acquire substantial real
63. Foreclosure developed in the English equity courts as a way to extinguish a mortga-
gor's right to redeem a debt in default. Typical foreclosure statutes will establish a fixed period,
after which the mortgagor's right to redeem is forever barred. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 60, § 1.3, at 8-9, § 7.5, at 485-88; W. WALSH, supra note 60, § 3, at 9-11.
64. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West 1980); see Roseleaf Corp. v. Chier-
ighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 38-39,'378 P.2d 97, 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1963) ("creditor must
rely upon his security before enforcing the debt").
65. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 60, § 1.6, at 11-13; 1 G. GLENN, MORT-
GAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS TO LAND § 20, at 122-29
(1943). In this scenario, the lender is technically the "beneficiary" under the deed of trust.
66. The trustee's sale or private power of sale has other advantages. For instance, in
California it circumvents the statutory redemption period of a judicial proceeding, during
which time the debtor can retain possession of the property. When available, the private sale is
used much more often than judicial foreclosure. R. BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE
AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE, § 6.3, at 258-59 (CEB 1979 & Supp. 1986).
67. See I G. GLENN, supra note 65, § 94.1, at 582-84. The mortgagee is free to bid at a
foreclosure by judicial sale, unless the foreclosure takes place in a state that permits foreclosure
by out-of-court sale. In such jurisdictions, the mortgagee may be precluded from bidding at its
own sale. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 60, § 7.21, at 548-49; W. WALSH, supra
note 60, § 83, at 349-51. Under the deed of trust, the lender is permitted to participate in the
trustee's sale. See 1 G. GLENN, supra note 65, § 108.1, at 650-53.
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property holdings.68
As an alternative to foreclosure, a lender may choose to accept the
deed to the mortgaged property in satisfaction of the mortgage debt.69
Accepting the deed in lieu of foreclosure avoids property sale costs. It is
also advantageous to the lender that seeks immediate title to the mort-
gaged property or believes that the value of the property exceeds the
amount of the outstanding debt.
Whenever a lender acts to satisfy a debt in default, it may become
vulnerable to CERCLA liability if the property contains an unmonitored
hazardous waste problem. Predictably, lenders adamantly disagree with
this result. They contend that the imposition of hazardous waste liability
on the basis of land ownership undermines the overall aim of commercial
lending law to protect creditors.70 It is not clear whether Congress in-
tended that a lender that takes title to property in this manner should
become liable for its borrower's hazardous waste problems. Congress did
create two exceptions, however, to landowner liability in CERCLA.
First, CERCLA recognizes a narrow class of affirmative defenses.71
Second, the Act excludes from its definition of a liable "owner or opera-
tor" persons holding "indicia of ownership" for the purpose of protecting
a security interest. Real estate lenders claim that this latter exemption
protects their actions in foreclosure. If the exemption of security interest
holders is to have any meaning, lenders contend, Congress must also
have intended to exclude those who act to satisfy a debt in default by
taking title to the property securing that debt.72
CERCLA's definition of a liable "owner or operator" provides little
insight into Congress' intentions. Section 101(20)(A) provides:
"[O]wner or operator" means... (ii) in the case of an onshore facility
or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility
.... Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership pri-
marily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. .... 73
Congress clearly intended to give lending institutions some relief
from the broad reach of CERCLA liability, at least to the extent that
they do not participate in managing the security property. As with many
CERCLA provisions, CERCLA's legislative history is silent on whether
68. The two largest holders of foreclosed farmlands, for example, have combined hold-
ings in excess of 3.6 million acres, valued at $1.8 billion. See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1987, at 9,
cols. 3, 5.
69. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 60, § 6.18, at 474.
70. See, e.g., Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on Banks, Credi-
tors, and Other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509, 524-36 (1986).
71. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 70; see also Moskowitz & Hoyt, supra note 45, at 1179.
73. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added).
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the exemption protects a lender that takes title to the mortgaged prop-
erty. In most instances, the mortgagee's decision to succeed in owner-
ship may be a sensible approach to protecting its financial stake in a bad
debt. By taking such action, however, the mortgagee replaces its limited
security interest in the property with actual ownership. The courts have
disagreed as to the effect of this result when applying the security interest
exemption to CERCLA liability.
III. Judicial Discord: CERCLA Claims Against Secured
Lenders
Two federal district court decisions frame the current dispute about
whether a foreclosing lender that takes title to its mortgaged property
becomes an "owner or operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability.74
Because higher court review was not pursued in either case, the law re-
mains unsettled. The issue of lender liability first was raised in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 75 That decision lays the groundwork for the
divergence in the district courts.
In re TP. Long Chemical, Inc.76 was an action by the EPA to re-
cover $37,859.35 in CERCLA response costs from the estate of a bank-
rupt debtor and its secured creditor, BancOhio National Bank
(BancOhio). BancOhio held a perfected security interest in the debtor's
personal property, including its accounts receivable, equipment, fixtures,
and inventory. Mr. Long and his wife owned, in fee simple, the real
property upon which the bankrupt corporation operated a rubber re-
cycling plant.
After initially fiing for reorganization, T.P. Long Chemical Com-
pany petitioned for dissolution under Chapter Seven of the Bankruptcy
Code.77 Pursuant to the petition, the bankruptcy trustee auctioned all
personal property in the debtor's estate except approximately ninety
drums that, unknown to anyone but Mr. Long, were buried at the rear of
the property. The EPA discovered that the drums contained several haz-
ardous substances. Because the unencumbered assets of the estate were
insufficient to pay the response costs at the site, the EPA sought payment
from the proceeds of the trustee's auction. 78
74. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985); see infra notes 84-113 and accompanying text; United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust,
632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); see infra notes 114-38 and accompanying text.
75. In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
76. Id.
77. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1986).
78. The bankruptcy judge rejected the government's claim to proceeds from the sale of
the debtor's property in which BancOhio held a perfected security interest. The EPA claimed
that it stood "in the shoes" of a bankruptcy trustee when it removed the hazardous waste and
therefore, was entitled to its expenses under the Bankruptcy Code. T.P. Long Chemical, 45
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BancOhio did not foreclose on its security interest. More impor-
tantly, foreclosure would not have led to liability under CERCLA be-
cause BancOhio's loan was secured by the debtor's personal property,
not the real property on which the wastes were buried. 79 Ignoring this
fact, the court stated in dictum that "even if BancOhio had repossessed
its collateral [the drums] pursuant to its security agreement[,] it would
not be an 'owner or operator' as defined under CERCLA.' ' 80 Foreclo-
sure, in the court's view, is merely a logical action taken by the lender to
protect its financial stake when the borrower defaults; it does not expose
the lender to liability.
The bankruptcy court found that the security interest exemption in
section 101(20)(A) was applicable because "[t]he only possible indicia of
ownership that can be attributed to BancOhio is that which is primarily
to protect its security interest." 81 Instead of addressing whether foreclo-
sure affected BancOhio's status as an exempt security interest holder, the
court considered only whether the bank had "participated in the manage-
ment" of the Long facility. 82 Finding no involvement that would pre-
clude the exemption, the bank was deemed protected. Eight months
later, in United States v. Mirabile, a federal court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania applied an analysis similar to the dictum in TP. Long
Chemical 83
A. United States v. Mirabile
United States v. Mirabile 84 was the first case to decide whether a
lender who forecloses on and takes title to its mortgaged property is an
"owner or operator" for purposes of CERCLA liability. The court also
examined when a lender may be liable as a result of its involvement in the
borrower's hazardous waste activities. This second issue dominates the
Bankr. at 287. The bankruptcy court rejected the claim, noting that BancOhio received no
benefit as a result of the response action. Id. at 288.
79. Section 107(a)(1) imposes liability on "the owner and operator of... a facility." The
drums that the defendant allegedly owned did not constitute a "facility" within the meaning of
§ 101(9). See supra note 31. Indeed, a "release" of hazardous substances that triggers CER-
CLA's provisions is defined to include "the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers,
and other closed receptacles ... ." CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (West Supp.
1987) (emphasis added). Because the loan was secured by personal property that was outside
the definition of a "facility," repossession of the drums would not have brought BancOhio
within CERCLA liability. See supra note 31.
80. T.P. Long Chemical, 45 Bankr. at 288.
81. Id. at 289.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985).
84. Id. In a companion case by the same name, the court held that the current owners of
the property may assert a third-party defense. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). This Note refers to the former decision, 15
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,994, except as indicated.
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court's analysis; indeed, the court offered only a cursory evaluation of
how foreclosure affects the application of the security interest exemption
in section 101(20)(A). As a result, the court concerned itself with the
question of when a lender is precluded from invoking section 101(20)(A),
rather than addressing whether the exemption applies in the first place.
Mirabile was an EPA action for the recovery of $249,792.52 spent in
removing approximately 550 drums of hazardous wastes85 from the site
of a defunct paint manufacturing business. The EPA filed its claim
against, among others, the current owners of the site, Anna and Thomas
Mirabile. The Mirabiles, in turn, joined American Bank and Trust
Company (American Bank) and Mellon Bank (East) National Associa-
tion (Mellon Bank). Both banks had loaned money to the site's former
owners.
86
During the 1970s, Arthur C. Mangels Industries, Inc. (Mangels)
owned and operated a paint manufacturing facility in Phoenixville, Penn-
sylvania. In 1973, American Bank loaned money to Mangels, secured in
part by a mortgage on the site. In 1976, Turco Coatings, Inc. (Turco)
acquired Mangels. 87 That same year, Turco borrowed advance working
capital from Girard Bank, the predecessor-in-interest of Mellon Bank.
The second loan was secured by Turco's inventory and assets. Turco
continued to manufacture paint at the site until 1980, when it ified for
protection under Chapter Eleven of the Bankruptcy Code.88 In the
course of manufacturing paint, both Mangels and Turco generated haz-
ardous wastes which were stored in drums on the site. The EPA brought
suit against both manufacturers for cleanup costs.89
In 1981, Turco's Chapter Eleven petition was dismissed and Ameri-
can Bank initiated a foreclosure action. American Bank, the highest
bidder at the sheriff's sale held on August 21, 1981, informed the sheriff
and the tax department that it intended to take title to the property. On
December 15, 1981, American Bank assigned its bid to Thomas Mirabile
who, along with his wife, accepted a sheriff's deed to the property.90
Shortly thereafter, state officials informed the Mirabiles that the drums
on the property contained hazardous substances and would have to be
85. EPA testing revealed that the drums contained several hazardous substances, includ-
ing benzene, ethylbenzene, napthalene, toluene, and mercury. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, at 20,993.
86. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,995. The Mirabiles also
joined several individuals who were connected to the property, including Robert Horstmann,
the former president and chairman of the board of the paint manufacturing company. See
United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. (E.D. Pa. June 6, 1985) (motion to dismiss
denied).
87. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,996.
88. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1986).
89. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,992-93.




During the four months between the sheriff's sale and the assign-
ment of its bid to the Mirabiles, American Bank officials visited the prop-
erty on several occasions for the purpose of showing it to prospective
purchasers. The bank also took steps to secure the site against vandal-
ism. Finally, the bank made inquiries about the cost of removing the
drums.92 These actions occurred several months after Turco ceased its
operations.
The Mirabiles joined both American Bank and Mellon Bank, alleg-
ing that they were "potentially responsible parties" under CERCLA.
American Bank denied that it was responsible for cleaning up the haz-
ardous waste and moved for summary judgment.93 The bank made two
arguments to support its motion. First, American Bank contended that
it was not an owner under CERCLA because it never held legal title to
the property. 94 Second, American Bank argued that its actions relating to
the Turco property, including the purchase, were taken merely to protect
its security interest.95 On this basis, the bank claimed protection as a
security interest holder.
The court granted American Bank's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the passage of title, whether legal or equitable, was irrele-
vant to the applicability of the security interest exemption. The court
stated that "[r]egardless of the nature of the title received by [American
Bank], actions with respect to the foreclosure were plainly undertaken in
an effort to protect [the bank's] security interest in the property. ' 96 The
court assumed that a secured lender is exempt from CERCLA liability in
its actions relating to the security property as long as its purpose is to
protect its security interest. The court summarily concluded that fore-
closure did not affect American Bank's status as an exempt security in-
terest holder. Moreover, the court held that the bank's purchase of the
Turco property did not bring it within CERCLA's definition of an owner
or operator because the purchase was incident to holding the security
interest.97
Having concluded that American Bank's status under section
101(20)(A) was unaffected by its purchase of the Turco site, the court
limited its analysis to the question of whether the lender had become so
91. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, at 20,993.
92. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,996.
93. Id.
94. American Bank argued that its successful bid at the foreclosure sale gave it only
equitable title to the property under Pennsylvania law. Equitable ownership, it argued, was
insufficient to bring it within CERCLA's definition of a site "owner or operator." The court
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"overly entangled" in its borrower's activities as to preclude the applica-
bility of the exemption. The court concluded it had not:
[B]efore a secured creditor such as [American Bank] may be held lia-
ble, it must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational
aspects of the site. In the instant case, [American Bank] merely fore-
closed on the property after all operations had ceased and thereafter
took prudent and routine steps to secure the property against further
depreciation. 98
Under Mirabile, a lender succeeding in title to its security property
is not an owner or operator within the meaning of CERCLA. This hold-
ing, however, operates under two caveats. First, the creditor's actions in
foreclosure must be limited to protecting its security interest.99 How
foreclosure can be undertaken for purposes other than to protect the se-
curity interest is unclear from the decision, because the right to foreclose
accrues only after the borrower has defaulted. The court hinted that a
foreclosing lender may be liable under CERCLA if it continues the oper-
ations that created the hazardous condition. 1°° This interpretation
would limit the advantage of foreclosing on income-producing property.
The second caveat is that any secured lender, whether its loan is
secured by real or personal property, must avoid becoming "overly en-
tangled" in its borrower's hazardous waste activities. 101 A lender "par-
ticipating in the management" of the security property, therefore, is
precluded from asserting the section 101(20)(A) exemption.10 2 The sig-
nificance of this qualification was demonstrated in the court's treatment
of the second lender, Mellon Bank.
The Mirabile court found itself faced with a "cloudier situation"
when it considered Mellon Bank's motion for summary judgment. 10 3
The Mirabiles joined Mellon Bank, alleging that the bank's involvement
with Turco Coatings brought it within the scope of CERCLA liability.
They contended that the bank was an owner or operator within the
meaning of section 101(20)(A) because of the level of its involvement in
the paint manufacturing. Mellon Bank denied that it was a responsible
party and moved for summary judgment. Holding that further fact-find-
ing was required, the court denied the bank's motion. 104
Mellon Bank, through its predecessor-in-interest, held a security in-
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. The court noted that the defendant made no effort to continue operations at the
Turco site and that foreclosure occurred eight months after all operations had ceased. Id.
Had the paint manufacturing, with the resulting generation of hazardous wastes, continued
after foreclosure, arguably the bank would be a liable "generator" under § 107(a)(3). The
security interest exemption in § 101(20)(A) does not extend to waste generators.
101. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,996.
102. See supra text accompanying note 73.




terest in Turco's inventory and assets. With the onset of financial diffi-
culties, the bank became involved in Turco's operations. One loan officer
served on an advisory board established to oversee Turco's operations; a
second loan officer was involved in monitoring Turco's financial condi-
tion. The bank's involvement deepened over time, and eventually in-
cluded making weekly visits and giving instructions concerning
manufacturing, personnel, and sales matters. When Turco ceased all op-
erations in 1980, the bank took possession of its inventory.10 5
In attempting to define how far a creditor could go in protecting its
financial interest before being subject to CERCLA liability, the court
noted that section 101(20)(A) exculpates security interest holders who
refrain from "participating in the management of a... facility.'10 6 Be-
cause the Act defines "facility" as the structure or site where hazardous
substances are stored, 10 7 the court interpreted the statute to impose lia-
bility on a secured party only if it participated in managing the actual
operation of the "facility." 108 Such involvement, the court noted, is to be
distinguished from a creditor's participation in its borrower's financial
decisions. Financial involvement, according to Mirabile, is not sufficient
to justify imposing CERCLA liability.' 0 9
Although the court noted that "[t]he reed upon which the Mirabiles
seek to impose liability on Mellon [Bank] is slender indeed,"' 10 it never-
theless concluded that a broader factual inquiry was necessary to deter-
mine whether the bank's involvement warranted the imposition of
liability. On this basis, the court denied Mellon Bank's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Mellon Bank settled with the EPA before the issue pro-
ceeded to trial."'
Mirabile was a bittersweet victory for the lending community. On
one hand, the court virtually dismissed the significance of the lender's
purchase of its security property in determining CERCLA liability. On
the other hand, the court cautioned that any lender, whether its loans are
secured by real or personal property, may be liable if it becomes too in-
volved in its borrower's operations. The decision yields a result rich in
irony. Both Mellon Bank, which never owned the site, and the
105. Because Mellon Bank's loan was secured by collateral other than property described
in the definition of a "facility" in section 101(9), the issue of CERCLA liability based on
ownership of a disposal facility was not present. But see In re T.P. Long Chem., Inc., 45
Bankr. 278, 288-89 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
106. See supra text accompanying note 73.
107. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West Supp. 1987); see supra note 31.
108. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,995-96.
109. The court stated that before a secured creditor may be held liable, "it must, at a
minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational aspects of the site." Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996.
110. Id. at 20,997.
111. A consent decree was filed on October 24, 1986. Confirmed by telephone interview
with Steven V. Englemyer, United States Attorney's Office (Mar. 13, 1987).
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Mirabiles, who were never involved in the waste dumping, were forced to
continue to trial. 112 In contrast, American Bank was dismissed from the
case although it had once owned the site and had been financially in-
volved with the waste dumpers. In effect, the holding in Mirabile allows
a lender to own a contaminated property without incurring CERCLA
liability as long as it is circumspect in its pre-foreclosure activities at the
site. The next court to consider the issue of lender liability rejected this
result. 113
B. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
Since Mirabile, another court has been presented with the question
of whether a lender which forecloses on and takes title to property con-
taining hazardous wastes is subject to CERCLA liability. Unlike
Mirabile, the court in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.1 14
held that the security interest exemption does not protect a mortgagee
that becomes an owner, an issue that the Mirabile court gave only a cur-
sory evaluation. Because it found liability, the court did not reach the
issue that occupied the Mirabile court: when is a lender precluded from
claiming the section 101(20)(A) exemption.
Herschel McLeod, Sr. and his wife owned a 117-acre farm in Cali-
fornia, Maryland. The McLeods operated two trash and garbage busi-
nesses at the site. During the 1970s, Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
(Maryland Bank) loaned money to Herschel McLeod for his business
operations. In 1980, the McLeods' son, Mark, borrowed $335,000 from
the bank to buy the family farm. The purchase was completed in De-
cember 1980. At some point in 1981, Mark McLeod stopped making
payments on the loan. In response, Maryland Bank instituted a foreclo-
sure action. On May 15, 1982, a foreclosure sale was held at which
Maryland Bank purchased the property with a high bid of $381,500.115
The bank still owned the property at the time of trial, nearly four years
later.
In June 1983, a little more than one year after the foreclosure sale,
the EPA inspected the site and discovered improperly disposed hazard-
ous wastes.1 16 Herschel McLeod had accepted the wastes at the site in
112. In addition to refusing to dismiss Mellon Bank, the court rejected the Mirabiles' mo-
tion for summary judgment. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, at 20,994.
The court ruled, however, that the Mirabiles would be allowed to raise a third-party defense.
See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. The Mirabiles settled before this issue was
litigated. See supra note I 11.
113. See infra notes 114-137 and accompanying text.
114. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
115. The record does not disclose why Maryland Bank bid in excess of the $335,000 mort-
gage debt.
116. The EPA inspection revealed two disposal areas containing deteriorated or leaking
drums, some of which were buried. Subsequent testing identified several hazardous substances,
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1972 or 1973. In response, the EPA ordered Maryland Bank to clean up
the site. When the bank refused, the EPA began removing the wastes.
Ultimately, the EPA removed 237 drums containing hazardous materials
and 1180 tons of contaminated soil.
The United States filed suit when Maryland Bank refused to reim-
burse the EPA for $551,713.50 spent in responding to the problem. The
government alleged that because Maryland Bank was the current owner
of the McLeod farm, it was liable for cleaning up the hazardous wastes
disposed there. Maryland Bank denied that it was a liable owner or oper-
ator within the meaning of section 101(20)(A). Both parties moved for
summary judgment.
The bank made three arguments supporting its motion. First, it
contended that current owners of hazardous waste sites are liable only in
the event that they also operate them. Second, the bank argued that the
security interest exemption insulated it from liability. Finally, it raised a
third-party defense, arguing that it had no connection with the dumping.
The court rejected the first two arguments and reserved judgment on the
third until after trial. Accordingly, the court denied Maryland Bank's
motion for summary judgment and granted the government partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of liability.1 17
In the first of its arguments, Maryland Bank contended that the defi-
nition of liable persons under section 107(a)(1) applied only to current
owners of hazardous waste properties who also operate them. This sec-
tion states that the owner and operator of a waste disposal facility is
liable for Superfund cleanup costs.1 18 Thus, the bank argued, it was not
liable because it never operated the garbage dump.
The court was not persuaded. Proper usage, it conceded, limits the
phrase the "owner and operator" to persons who are both owners and
operators. However, the court concluded that "to slavishly follow the
laws of grammar while interpreting acts of Congress would violate sound
canons of statutory interpretation."'1 9 Such caution, in the court's opin-
ion, was particularly appropriate in light of the haste with which Con-
gress enacted CERCLA.
The court also reviewed CERCLA's legislative history. It found
that an early version of the legislation defined an "operator" to mean one
who carries out functions for the "owner." Under such a definition, an
operator cannot be the same person as an owner. Therefore, the court
reasoned, the construction of section 107(a)(1) urged by the defendant
including: chromium, lead, cadmium, mercury, cyanide compounds, ethylbenzene, toluene,
and xylenes. Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) PEND. LIT. 65,847 (1985).
117. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 582.
118. CERCLA § 107(a)(l), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987); see supra note 30.
119. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578.
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would render the provision useless. 120
Finally, the court relied on New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 121 for
the proposition that section 107(a)(1) imposes strict liability on the cur-
rent owner of a CERCLA site, without regard to causation. Under the
bank's interpretation of section 107(a)(1), a landowner would only be
liable if it had participated in the actual operation of the waste site. This
reading of the statute, the court held, conflicted with the Second Circuit's
ruling in Shore Realty.
The central issue raised in the case was whether the security interest
exemption insulates from CERCLA liability a lender succeeding in own-
ership of its security property. Maryland Bank argued that it was within
the exculpatory language in section 101(20)(A) because it acquired the
McLeod farm for the sole purpose of protecting its security interest. The
court rejected this claim. Instead, it held that the security interest ex-
emption does not protect a lender that holds title to the mortgaged prop-
erty at the time of the Superfund cleanup. 122
In contrast to its liberal interpretation of section 107(a)(1), the court
approved a literal reading of the security interest exemption. Section
101(20)(A) excludes from the definition of "owner or operator" one who,
"without participating in the management of a... facility, holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the ... facil-
ity.' 1 23 In the court's opinion, the verb tense of the exclusionary provi-
sion is critical. It reasoned that by using the present tense, Congress
intended to exclude only those actually holding security interests at the
time of the Superfund cleanup. If one holds the indicia of ownership to
protect a security interest, then that security interest must exist at the
time the exemption is invoked.
The purpose of the exemption, the court reasoned, was to protect
secured lenders in Maryland and other states that follow the common
law rule of mortgages. In such jurisdictions, a mortgagee holds legal "ti-
tle" to the mortgaged realty until the loan obligation is satisfied. 24 The
"title" so held describes only the relationship between the parties to the
120. Id.
121. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit stated: "Section 9607(a)(1)
[107(a)(1)] unequivocably imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility.., without
regard to causation." Id. at 1044. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578.
122. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 578-80. The defendant also argued that it
was an "involuntary owner" of the McLeod property. Maryland Bank alleged that it was
compelled by Farmers Home Administration, which had guaranteed the loan up to 90% of its
value, to foreclose and bid on the site. The court rejected this claim, stating that it would not
"carve a judicially-created loophole" in CERCLA. Id. at 580 n.8. The court indicated that it
would allow the issue to be raised in the bank's counterclaim against Farmers Home Adminis-
tration; however, the counterclaim was dismissed at the parties' request. Id.
123. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis ad-
ded); see supra text accompanying note 73.
124. See supra note 60; see also infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
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mortgage; the mortgagor is recognized as the owner of the mortgaged
property in all other contexts. 125 The court concluded that Congress in-
tended under section 101(20)(A) to exempt only mortgagees that hold
the indicia of ownership in the form of common law legal title at the time
of the cleanup. The court based its conclusion on a committee report
accompanying an early version of the legislation that referred to the ex-
clusion of those that "hold title ... in order to secure a loan."' 126 The
court viewed this reference as evidence that Congress intended the excul-
patory language in section 101(20)(A) to protect mortgagees in jurisdic-
tions governed by the common law of mortgages. To extend the
exemption to mortgagees that have acquired the mortgaged property, the
court concluded, is not consistent with that purpose. I27
In applying this interpretation to the case, the court found that the
security interest exemption did not apply to Maryland Bank. Although
the bank held a mortgage on the McLeod farm at the time of the cleanup,
the security interest, the court concluded, "terminated at the foreclosure
sale ... at which time it ripened into full title." 128 Under this construc-
tion, Maryland Bank was not entitled to the exemption because it had
replaced its security interest with full legal title.
As a final reason to hold Maryland Trust responsible, the court em-
phasized the policy implications of exempting lenders that otherwise fall
within CERCLA liability. Specifically, the court objected to the possibil-
ity that lenders would enjoy an unfair advantage in real estate markets
under a broader interpretation. The court stated:
Under the scenario put forward by the bank, the federal government
alone would shoulder the cost of cleaning up the site, while the former
mortgagee-turned-owner, would benefit from the clean-up by the in-
creased value of the now unpolluted land. At the foreclosure sale, the
mortgagee could acquire the property cheaply. All other prospective
purchasers would be faced with potential CERCLA liability, and
would shy away from the sale. Yet once the property has been cleared
at the taxpayers' expense and becomes marketable, the mortgagee-
turned-owner would be in a position to sell the site at a profit.' 29
Exempting lenders that hold full title to waste sites, the court rea-
soned, would frustrate the distribution of cleanup costs achieved by
CERCLA. 30 It would also reallocate the risks assumed in owning real
property. The court took particular exception to this result, pointing out
that lenders already have the means to protect themselves by making
125. Id.
126. H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 36 (1979), reprinted in 2 A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY AcT OF 1980, at 546 (1983).
127. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 580
130. Id.
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prudent loans. It noted that lenders are in a position to investigate and
discover potential problems, and can refrain from foreclosing or bidding
at the foreclosure sale.131 For these reasons, the court concluded, lenders
do not need the protection of a broad reading of section 101(20)(A).
After finding liability, the court offered Maryland Bank a glimmer
of hope by reserving judgment on the bank's third-party defense. Section
107(b)(3) excuses an otherwise liable party that can establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the hazardous waste problem was caused
solely by an unrelated third party.132 To claim the defense, the defend-
ant must also show that it exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substances and took precautions against the foreseeable acts of
others. 133
The court rejected the government's claim that Maryland Bank
could not invoke the defense because of its lengthy business relations
with the McLeods. It coficluded that more evidence was required to es-
tablish the status of the relationship between the parties at the time the
dumping occurred. In particular, the court suggested that a mortgagee-
turned-owner may be precluded from raising a third-party defense where
it was contractually linked to the toxic dumper by virtue of an outstand-
ing loan at the time of the waste disposal.134 Maryland Bank settled with
the EPA before this issue proceeded to trial.135
On its face, Maryland Bank & Trust offers a hard and fast rule for
lender liability: a secured creditor is exempt from CERCLA liability un-
less it purchases the mortgaged property. The court, however, expressly
limited its decision to the facts of the case. It emphasized the length of
the bank's ownership, noting that the defendant had held the property
for four years, including one full year prior to the Superfund cleanup.
The court used this fact to distinguish Mirabile, in which the foreclosing
bank promptly assigned its interest to another party. 36
131. Id.; see also infra note 181 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
133. In October 1986, six months after the decision in Maryland Bank & Trust, Congress
enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act. See supra note 19. Included in
the 1986 legislation are two additional requirements for landowners seeking to avoid liability
for hazardous conditions created by a previous owner. Under the new law, the defendant must
show that it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the hazardous waste condition at
the time it acquired the property. In addition, the defendant landowner must show that it
made a reasonable inquiry about hazardous wastes. CERCLA § 101(35), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9601(35) (West Supp. 1987); see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
134. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 581. The United States also alleged that
Maryland Bank could not prove that it had exercised reasonable care. The court, again citing
the need for further inquiry, declined to grant the government's motion for summary judg-
ment. Id. at 581-82.
135. An administrative order dismissing the case pending settlement was filed on Feburary
6, 1987. Confirmed by telephone interview with Ellen M. Mahan, Land & Natural Resources
Division, United States Department of Justice (Mar. 13, 1987).
136. "Because [Maryland Bank] has held the property for such an extended period of
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The addition of a duration requirement, however, conflicts with the
logic of the decision. If a court denies a lender the security interest ex-
emption because the lender has converted its interest into ownership,
then the logical point for liability to arise is when the security interest
ceases to exist. The decision itself contains language supporting this con-
clusion. 137 Moreover, other courts have rejected the notion that the
length of ownership is relevant in establishing CERCLA liability.138
IV. Comparing Judicial Applications to CERCLA's Structure
and Objectives: A Case for Lender Liability
Mirabile and Maryland Bank & Trust approach the issue of lender
liability from opposite directions. The Mirabile court was primarily con-
cerned with giving full effect to the security interest exemption in section
101(20)(A). It gave virtually no weight to the passage of title to the
foreclosing bank. Indeed, the Mirabile court treated the bank's purchase
at the foreclosure sale as merely incident to the holding of a security
interest to which the exemption logically extends. Thus, the court lim-
ited its analysis to determining whether the lender was precluded from
asserting the exemption because of its involvement in the operation of the
borrower's facilities.
Manifesting an entirely different concern, the Maryland Bank &
Trust court sought to avoid establishing a rule that would allow secured
lenders to profit from government cleanup actions. It approved a narrow
reading of the security interest exemption under which the passage of
title at foreclosure is dispositive. A secured lender, under this analysis, is
exempt from CERCLA liability only while the security instrument is in
force. By purchasing the mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale, the
lender converts its security interest into full ownership and becomes sub-
ject to the same liabilities as other landowners. As a result, a mortgagee-
time, this Court need not consider the issue of whether a secured party which purchased the
property at a foreclosure sale and then promptly resold it would be precluded from asserting
the section 101(20)(A) exemption." Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579 n.5.
137. The court stated:
The exemption of [section 101(20)(A)] covers only those persons who, at the
time of the cleanup, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest
in the land .... The security interest must exist at the time of the cleanup. The
mortgage held by [Maryland Bank] (the security interest) terminated at the foreclo-
sure sale ... at which time it ripened into full title.
Id. at 579 (emphasis added); see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
138. See, eg., United States v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,698
(D.S.C. June 15, 1984) (defendant may be a liable "owner" because it held legal title to CER-
CLA site for one hour and had acted as "conduit" in sale of the property).
Deference to the experience of Judge Newcomer, author of Mirabile, is a possible explana-
tion of the court's inconsistency in Maryland Bank & Trust. Prior to Mirabile, Judge New-
comer had issued the opinion in United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983), a
frequently cited case in CERCLA litigation.
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turned-owner can escape liability only to the extent it can establish one
of the affirmative defenses in section 107(b).
The narrow construction of the security interest exemption adopted
by the Maryland Bank & Trust court best reflects CERCLA's express
and implied objectives. The opposite holding in Mirabile illustrates why
a narrow construction is preferable. The rule in Mirabile, which extends
the exemption to lenders who succeed in ownership of CERCLA sites,
conflicts with the language and purpose of section 101(20)(A). It creates
an exempt class from otherwise liable landowners based on an artificial
distinction drawn from the circumstances by which the realty was ac-
quired. More importantly, allowing lenders to retain their exempt status
after foreclosure frustrates CERCLA's objectives in the allocation of
hazardous waste cleanup costs. The decision in Maryland Bank & Trust
answers these concerns. Moreover, its narrow construction of the secur-
ity interest exemption furthers CERCLA's implicit objective of encour-
aging safer waste disposal practices by involving lenders in waste
management.
A. The Language and Purpose of Section 101(20)(A)
Congress had a purpose in mind when it exempted security interest
holders from CERCLA liability. Absent a legislative record, 139 it is rea-
sonable to conclude that Congress intended to exclude security interest
holders from cleanup liability because they have only an attenuated con-
nection to hazardous waste property. This conclusion draws support
from Congress' denial of the exemption when the secured party has a
more substantial connection because it participates in managing the se-
curity property.
The statutory language of the security interest exemption, as pointed
out in Maryland Bank & Trust,14° also supports a limited application.
The reference to a creditor that "holds" a security interest clearly implies
that Congress intended to exempt only those actually holding security
interests at the time the exemption is invoked. Moreover, the use of the
term "indicia of ownership" which, in other contexts, has been held to
mean the appearance of ownership, strongly suggests that persons hold-
ing actual title ownership are outside section 101(20)(A) protection.141
That CERCLA was enacted in great haste, however, cautions against
placing too much weight on a literal reading of the statute.
139. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
140. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 579; see supra notes 123-28 and accompany-
ing text.
141. See, e.g., 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 105, at 614 (1986); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 295-96, at
1107-08, 1111 (1952); see also Weisinger v. Flatbush Auto Discount Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 1008,




By extending the exempt status of creditors to actions they take af-
ter foreclosure, the Mirabile court adopted a rule that exceeds the pur-
pose of the exculpatory provision. Since seventeenth century England,
the mortgagor has been recognized as enjoying full ownership of the
mortgaged property, subject only to the mortgagee's security rights. 142
Although at common law the execution of a mortgage vested legal title in
the mortgagee, the interest taken was for security purposes only and lia-
bilities founded upon land ownership did not attach to it. The modem
trend in this country has been to view the mortgage as creating a lien for
the benefit of the mortgagee. 143 This American invention has the advan-
tage of explicitly recognizing the mortgagor's ownership of the property.
Congress codified the principle of mortgage ownership in section
101(20)(A). Thus, the statute exempts a person who merely holds a se-
curity interest in the hazardous waste property even though that interest
may give the appearance of actual ownership. When a mortgagee suc-
ceeds in ownership of the mortgaged property, however, it takes an inter-
est in the realty equal to any other landowner. Thus, the rationale for
exempting security interest holders-that their connection to the security
property is insufficient to warrant CERCLA liability-is no longer rele-
vant when a secured party has replaced its security interest with actual
ownership.
The expansive reading of section 101(20)(A) approved in Mirabile
also conflicts with the statute's limited legislative record. In view of Con-
gress' broad definition of CERCLA liability, 144 it is unlikely that Con-
gress would exclude an entire class of otherwise liable landowners
without any explanation or record of debate. A more plausible explana-
tion is that by adopting the exculpatory language in section 101(20)(A),
Congress intended merely to codify the recognition of the mortgagor as
the owner of the mortgaged property.145 Thus, when the mortgagee suc-
ceeds in title, it becomes the owner for all purposes, including CERCLA
liability.
The Maryland Bank & Trust court recognized the limited purpose
of section 101(20)(A) intended by Congress. Accordingly, the court
ruled that the provision protects a secured party that is connected to a
hazardous waste property only by virtue of its security interest. Since the
security interest terminates with the sale of the property at foreclosure,
the court reasoned that a secured party electing to participate in the fore-
closure bidding is exposed to the same potential liability as the other
bidders. The same result will occur when the lender purchases the prop-
142. See W. WALSH, supra note 60, § 3, at 9. For example, the mortgagor's ownership
was recognized in determining the right to shoot game and the right to vote as owner of a
freehold estate. Id. § 5, at 20-21.
143. See supra note 60.
144. See supra note 30.
145. See supra note 60 and text accompanying notes 142-143.
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erty from the third-party trustee in a deed of trust,146 or accepts the deed
to the property in lieu of foreclosure. 147
Lenders reject the narrow construction of the security interest ex-
emption adopted in Maryland Bank & Trust.148 They argue that for the
exemption to have any meaning, Congress must have intended to ex-
clude lenders that act to satisfy a debt in default. This argument mistates
the result reached in Maryland Bank & Trust: a lender can foreclose to
protect its financial stake in a bad debt; however, a lender may incur
CERCLA liability if it chooses to acquire the mortgaged property. Fore-
closure may still yield an unsatisfactory result for the mortgagee under
this interpretation because knowledge of a hazardous condition will de-
press the bidding at the foreclosure sale. This risk, however, is but an
extension of the risk lenders normally bear-the risk that the property
taken as a security may prove less valuable than originally envisioned.
B. Landowner Liability Under CERCLA
The Mirabile court treated the bank's purchase of the mortgaged
property as a natural consequence of protecting its financial interest in
the mortgage debt. Because the bank was only protecting its interest, the
court concluded, the bank was not a liable "owner or operator" under
CERCLA. This analysis, however, does not provide a basis for the re-
sulting disparate treatment of landowners: those that own land contain-
ing hazardous wastes are generally liable for cleanup, except for those
that held a mortgage on the property prior to owning it. Although the
court did not articulate this distinction, it did reach this result. On the
same day that the court dismissed American Bank because its purchase
of the property did not make it an owner or operator within the meaning
of CERCLA, 149 the court denied the summary judgment motion of Anna
146. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
147. See supra text accompanying note 69.
148. See, e.g., Fleischaker & Mitchell, The Insecurity of Security Interests in Hazardous
Waste Cases, 9 NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 1986, at 18-20.
149. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,996; see supra notes 96-97
and accompanying text. Ironically, American Bank might not have been a "potentially re-
sponsible party." Unlike the defendant bank in Maryland Bank & Trust, the foreclosing bank
in Mirabile did not fit any of the then-recognized categories of liable landowners. American
Bank was neither the current owner of the site, see CERCLA § 107(a)(1), supra note 30, nor
the owner at the time of disposal, see id. at § 107(a)(2); see also Cadillac Fairview/California,
Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,376, 20,378 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
1984) (holding prior owner not liable when it neither deposited nor allowed others to deposit
hazardous wastes during its ownership of the realty). However, the 1986 Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act, see supra note 19, includes a provision making liable any prior
landowner that transfers title to real property without disclosing the existence of a hazardous
condition known to it. See also, supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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and Thomas Mirabile, who purchased the property from the bank.150
How a statute that imposes liability on the basis of landownership can be
interpreted to reach such conflicting results defies logic and common
sense.
Mortgage law makes no distinction in the character of ownership
acquired by a mortgagee when it purchases the mortgage property. The
mortgagee-in-possession rule illustrates this point. At common law, a
mortgagee had a legal right to possession prior to default or foreclosure
to protect its security.151 Most jurisdictions today require express or im-
plied consent of the mortgagor before the mortgagee may take posses-
sion. 152 Moreover, the right of possession terminates with satisfaction of
the debt by foreclosure or redemption. Once in possession, the mortga-
gee is personally liable for tort injuries resulting from its use of the prop-
erty or its failure to perform duties imposed by law upon landowners.1 53
It is anomalous to conclude that the duty to the public of a lender that
purchases its security property in fee simple is less than that of a mortga-
gee-in-possession. Instead, logic compels the conclusion that a mortga-
gee that becomes an owner should be subject to the same liabilities as any
other landowner.
Similarly, the common law tort of nuisance does not distinguish be-
tween the liability of landowners according to how they acquired their
holdings. At common law, an action for nuisance lies against the party
in possession of the property that contains the hazardous condition. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that current owners are
liable for damages resulting from artificial conditions created by prior
owners.154 In its explanatory comments, the Second Restatement makes
explicit that "a vendee... of land upon which a harmful physical condi-
tion exists may be liable ... for failing to abate it after he takes posses-
150. The Mirabiles settled with the EPA before proceeding to trial on their third-party
defense. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
151. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 60, § 1.2, at 6-7; W. WALSH, supra note
60, § 18, at 91.
152. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 60, § 4.24, at 200-05; W. WALSH, supra
note 60, § 18, at 91-92, § 19, at 97-100. In addition to consent, a lender may become a mortga-
gee-in-possession as a result of a defective foreclosure sale. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
supra note 60, § 4.24 at 202-03.
153. See, eg., City of Newark v. Sue Corp., 124 N.J. Super. 5, 8, 304 A.2d 567, 569 (1973)
("A mortgagee in possession may be liable to third persons for negligence in connection with
the property .... "); 2 G. GLENN, supra note 65, § 204.1, at 1030-31, § 217.1, at 1063-64; G.
NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 60, § 4.26, at 206-08.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 (1977). The section states:
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sion, even though ... he had no part in its creation." 155
The Mirabile court exempted American Bank from CERCLA liabil-
ity because the bank's purpose in acquiring the property was "plainly" to
protect its financial stake in the mortgaged debt. In this fashion, the
court recognized an exception to the general rule of successor CERCLA
liability based on the lender's association with the property prior to ac-
quisition. The distinction the Mirabile court attempts to draw is neither
recognized at common law nor grounded in logic.
By contrast, the rule adopted in Maryland Bank & Trust is consis-
tent in its treatment of potential CERCLA defendants. The holding does
not necessarily require the mortgagee-turned-owner to assume legal re-
sponsibility for hazardous waste problems created by the mortgagor.
Rather, the decision puts a creditor acquiring the mortgaged property
on the same footing as any other landowning CERCLA defendant. This
result also comports with Congress' express intent that issues of CER-
CLA liability be resolved by application of common law principles.1 56
Thus, the mortgagee-turned-owner can avoid liability to the extent it can
raise one of the defenses in section 107(b), 157 or can seek contribution
from other potential CERCLA defendants, including the defaulting
borrower. 158
C. CERCLA's Allocation of Cleanup Costs
CERCLA represents a deliberate attempt by Congress to internalize
the costs of cleaning up hazardous wastes within the hazardous waste
industry.1 59 This internalization is accomplished in two ways. First,
funding of Superfund is derived initially from a special per-barrel tax
A possessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused while he is in
possession by an abatable artificial condition on the land, if the nuisance is otherwise
actionable, and
(a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition and the nuisance or
unreasonable risk of nuisance involved, and
(b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected
by it, and
(c) he has failed after a reasonable opportunity to take reasonable steps to abate
the condition or to protect the affected persons against it.
See also Bleicher & Stonelake, supra note 45, at 10,018.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 comment d (1977).
156. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. But see Maryland Bank & Trust, 632
F. Supp. at 581-82 (suggesting that existence of an outstanding loan at the time of waste dump-
ing may preclude lender's third-party defense).
158. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. Seeking contribution, at least from the
defaulting mortgagor, may have limited effectiveness.
159. In an economically efficient market, costs such as harm or damage caused by pollu-
tion are borne by the producer that, in turn, passes them on to the consumer in the form of
higher prices. A market failure occurs when a disproportionate share of the costs falls on
individuals or is left to the government. Typically, federal environmental legislation attempts
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imposed on current petroleum and chemical producers. 16° In this man-
ner, current producers are taxed for the cleanup of health and environ-
mental problems created in prior years. Second, CERCLA's broad
liability scheme imposes hazardous waste cleanup costs on those respon-
sible for creating the problem. Thus, persons who generate or transport
waste, or allow such materials to be disposed on their property are poten-
tially liable for the government's cleanup costs.
Making the current owners of CERCLA sites liable, subject only to
the narrow defenses in section 107(b), underscores Congress' awareness
of the difficulties in finding and obtaining full recovery from those actu-
ally generating and dumping toxic waste. It is also a legislative judgment
that the costs of hazardous waste cleanup are to be borne primarily by
private parties rather than the federal treasury. Including current land-
owners in CERCLA's liability scheme greatly enhances the government's
chances for recovering at least a portion of its cleanup costs. There is
some economic justification for this result. The current owner stands to
benefit from the removal of the toxic materials since the value of the
property will presumably increase after cleanup. 161 Moreover, current
owners have a common law obligation to abate harmful physical condi-
tions on their land. 162 To the extent that the government intercedes to
remedy the problem, it is therefore reasonable to impose those costs on
the otherwise liable owner. These justifications apply with equal force to
banks with real property holdings as to other landowners.
In approving a narrow construction of the security interest exemp-
tion, the Maryland Bank & Trust court was clearly guided by a sense of
fairness in the social allocation of hazardous waste cleanup costs. To
exempt landowning creditors would create a special class among other-
wise liable landowners. Its members would reap a windfall benefit from
Superfund-financed response actions. At the foreclosure sale, for exam-
ple, the foreclosing lender could acquire the contaminated property
cheaply because all other prospective purchasers would face potential
CERCLA liability. Once the government had cleared the property of the
toxic wastes, the former mortgagee could sell the property at a price re-
flecting its increased value due to the cleanup. The government, in such
a scenario, would be limited in its ability to recover response costs. It
would face the difficult task of identifying and collecting from the gener-
ators or transporters of the hazardous wastes, or collecting an unlikely
recovery from the defaulting mortgagor.
to approximate the results of an efficient market by taxing or regulating polluters. See Note,
Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1477-80 (1986).
160. See supra note 23.
161. This "benefit" may be obscured in many cases because the cleanup will only return
the property to the value that the current owner paid, a price that did not reflect the existence
or magnitude of the environmental burden.
162. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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The Mirabile court was not moved by these concerns. In anticipa-
tion of its critics, the court acknowledged the difficulties the government
faces in recovering its costs in cleaning CERCLA sites. The court con-
ceded that bringing lenders under CERCLA liability would enhance the
government's chances of full recovery, and might lead to more responsi-
ble management of waste disposal sites. The court concluded, however,
that the decision to impose liability based on these considerations belongs
to Congress. 163
The court's restraint in Mirabile overlooks the haste with which
CERCLA was enacted. From the outset, the judiciary has played a cen-
tral role in the evolution of hazardous waste liability. 164 By framing its
decision without reference to public policy concerns, the Mirabile deci-
sion departs from clear judicial precedent. The trend in CERCLA cases,
exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in New York v. Shore Realty
Corp.,165 has been to interpret broadly who may be liable under CER-
CLA. This trend is consistent with the general principle that courts
should liberally construe statutes enacted for the protection and preser-
vation of public health.1 66 A recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sion highlighted the importance of environmental laws by holding that a
bankruptcy trustee may not abandon a polluted property in violation of
state health and safety laws. 167
In addition, the result in the Mirabile decision is inconsistent with
recent changes in CERCLA approved by Congress. In the fall of 1986,
Congress approved a five-year reauthorization of CERCLA. 168 The most
controversial feature of the measure was a five-fold increase in funding
for Superfund. 169 The legislation also included sweeping changes in fed-
163. The court stated:
Obviously, imposition of liability on secured creditors or lending institutions
would enhance the government's chances of recovering its cleanup costs, given the
fact that owners and operators of hazardous waste dumpsites are often elusive, de-
funct, or otherwise judgment proof. It may well be that the imposition of such liabil-
ity would help ensure more responsible management of such sites. The consideration
of such policy matters and the decision as to the imposition of such liability, how-
ever, lies with Congress.
Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994, at 20,996.
164. See supra notes 17-19, 52-57 and accompanying text.
165. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
166. See 3A N.J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 71.02, at 517 (4th
ed. 1986). "For some time the courts have been committed to give statutes which are enacted
for the protection and preservation of public health an extremely liberal construction in order
to accomplish and maximize their beneficent objectives." Id. (emphasis added).
167. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S.Ct. 755, reh'g
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1482 (1986).
168. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613 (1986).
169. The new law increases funding of Superfund from the $1.6 billion approved in 1980
to $8.5 billion. The replenishment will be derived from a per-barrel tax on petroleum and
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eral toxic cleanup efforts. Among these changes, Congress expanded the
definition of who may be liable, 170 when liability arises, 171 and the
amount of liability.172 It also authorized an automatic federal lien on
real property that has been the object of a Superfund-financed cleanup in
the amount of the government's costs. 173 Finally, Congress increased the
civil and criminal penalties imposed under the Act. 174 Two factors un-
derlie these changes: Congress' growing appreciation of the magnitude of
the toxic waste problem, and its continued unwillingness to open the
public fisc to pay for the cleanup. 175 The rule adopted in Mirabile cannot
be reconciled with these legislative developments. 176
D. CERCLA's Incentives for Safer Disposal Practices
In addition to internalizing toxic cleanup costs, CERCLA's liability
scheme also creates incentives for safer handling and disposal of wastes.
For example, the Act identifies waste generators as potential defendants.
Because generators know in advance that they may be liable for improp-
erly disposed wastes, they are more likely to accept the higher costs of
disposing waste at a licensed facility than to assume the risk of disposing
by the most expedient or inexpensive means available. The effect of this
chemical producers and from general federal revenues. Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, §§ 501-531, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
170. A landowner may be liable for selling property without disclosing a known hazardous
waste condition. CERCLA § 101(35)(C), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(35)(C) (West Supp. 1987); see
supra note 35 and accompanying text.
171. Congress amended the definition of "release" or threatened "release" of hazardous
substances that triggers CERCLA to include "the abandonment or discarding of barrels, con-
tainers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or con-
taminant .... ." CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (West Supp. 1987).
172. The definition of "remedy" or "remedial action" for which the government can claim
its expenses was amended to include "offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruc-
tion, or secure disposition of hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials."
Id. § 101(24), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24).
173. Id. § 107()-(m), 42 U.S.C.A. § 96070)-(m). The government's rights are explicitly
subordinate to the rights of others, including secured creditors, whose interests were perfected
before notice of the lien was filed or actual notice received. Id. § 107()(3), 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(1)(3).
174. Id. § 103(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9603(b) (increasing maximum criminal sentence from one
to three years for first offenses); id. § 109(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9609(a)-(b) (increasing maxi-
mum civil penalty from $10,000 to $25,000 per day for first offenses); see supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
176. It should be noted that the substantive mark-up of the reauthorization legislation was
completed prior to the decisions in Mirabile and Maryland Bank & Trust. The Senate ap-
proved its CERCLA reauthorization proposal September 26, 1985; see 131 CONG. REC.
S12,184 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1985); the House approved its proposal December 10, 1985; see
131 CONG. Rc. Hi 1,595 (daily ed. December 10, 1985). Mirabile was decided September 4,
1985; see 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. September 4, 1985); Maryland
Bank & Trust was decided April 9, 1986; see 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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scheme is two-fold. First, it depresses the market for those engaged in
illegal waste disposal. Second, the increased costs to manufacturers be-
comes part of the cost of doing business. In this way, the costs of safer
waste disposal are internalized within the industry. 177
CERCLA also encourages safer procedures by assigning liability to
parties that can influence waste disposal practices. The third-party de-
fense in section 107(b)(3) illustrates well this second internalization fea-
ture. The section exculpates CERCLA site owners that can show that
the hazardous waste problem was created solely by a third party with
whom they had no connection. 178 Two additional requirements must be
satisfied. First, the site owner must show that it exercised due care with
regard to the hazardous substances and took precautions against the
foreseeable acts of others. 179 Second, the site owner must show that it
had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the pollution at the
time it acquired the property. 180 With respect to the second requirement,
the Act requires that the defendant inquire about prior uses of the prop-
erty in order to identify potential contamination.
The narrowly drawn defense clearly evinces Congress' desire to en-
list, albeit with the threat of liability, the help of parties not actually
responsible for creating the toxic problems. CERCLA requires prospec-
tive land buyers, in effect, to become a hazardous waste police force by
requiring purchasers to investigate for hazardous wastes. Subjecting
buyers to this affirmative duty may deter sellers from dumping hazardous
waste on property they intend to put on the market, and may encourage
such sellers to undertake cleanup actions themselves.
The result reached in Maryland Bank & Trust conforms with CER-
CLA's implicit function of encouraging safer hazardous waste proce-
dures. The possibility that CERCLA liability will depress the value of
the security property provides economic incentive for lenders to guard
against its misuse. Lending institutions are especially well-equipped for
this function. They can require the borrower to submit to periodic envi-
ronmental audits, either as a condition to receiving a loan or by an
amendment to an existing agreement.18' Lenders can also require war-
ranties from their borrowers guaranteeing that they are in full compli-
ance with hazardous waste laws and regulations. 182 Other forms of
collateral, such as personal property, may be used as security when con-
tamination is possible. Ultimately, lenders can refuse to lend money to
177. See Note, supra note 159, at 1513, 1519-20.
178. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
181. See Earl, Environmental Auditing: What Your Client Doesn't Know Hurts the Most,
60 FLA. B. J., Jan. 1986, at 47; see also Burcat, supra note 70, at 537.
182. See Glenn & Steinberg, The Environmental Liability Crisis, 170 BANKER MAG.,
May-June 1987, at 40-41; see also Burcat, supra note 70, at 537.
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persons believed to be operating illegal or improper hazardous waste ac-
tivities. While there is a clear risk that innocent borrowers will find it
difficult to obtain credit because of the nature of their business, this result
is consistent with CERCLA's general effect of spreading hazardous
waste costs industry-wide.
To require lenders to police their security properties calls attention
to the language of section 101(20)(A), providing that a security interest
holder is exempt from CERCLA liability as long as it refrains from "par-
ticipating in the management" of the security property.18 3 A literal read-
ing of the restriction will impede lenders that wish to monitor their
borrower's use of the security property. Such a result conflicts with the
Act's purpose of assigning liability to private parties that can influence
waste disposal practices. Accordingly, the stricture should be construed
to allow lenders sufficient authority to guard against illegal or improper
dumping.
The court's refusal in Mirabile to dismiss the second lender, Mellon
Bank, is the only example to date of lender liability resulting from a
lender's involvement in its borrower's operations.184 The court distin-
guished between participation in financial decisions and in decisions af-
fecting the operations of the security property. Only involvement in the
latter, according to the Mirabile court, gives rise to liability. 185
A further refinement is in order. To effectuate the goal of safe waste
disposal, security interest holders must be allowed to oversee and moni-
tor certain operational aspects of the property. For example, a lender
might require a borrower, known to generate hazardous substances, to
provide copies of receipts showing that it is disposing the wastes at a
licensed facility. It is also consistent with CERCLA's objectives to al-
low a lender to work with a borrower in removing hazardous substances
from the site. Indeed, a lender may be willing to advance additional
funds for such purposes, knowing that the value of its security property
will increase. A borrower, in turn, likely would welcome the opportunity
to relieve itself of the potential liability. The Mirabile decision would
appear to have the unfortunate effect of proscribing such "operational"
involvement.
If a lender knowingly loans money to a business engaged in im-
proper waste disposal, it should be liable under the "make the polluter
pay" principle. 18 6 This same rationale should apply when a secured
party participates in making decisions about the operation of the waste
183. See supra text accompanying note 73.
184. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of
chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they
created.").
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site. A lender's actions that conflict with CERCLA's twin aims of clean-
ing up hazardous waste sites and encouraging safer disposal practices are
not deserving of protection. In view of Congress' broad delegation of
authority to the judiciary in interpreting CERCLA liability,187 it is an
appropriate function of the courts to delineate when a lender's involve-
ment will give rise to liability. In so doing, the rule offered by Mirabile
should be rejected as inadequate.
V. Conclusion
CERCLA exempts security interest holders from hazardous waste
cleanup. Acquisition of the security property is a common and, indeed,
sometimes logical way for a secured party to satisfy a debt in default. It
is tempting to complete this syllogism by concluding that a secured party
ought to be exempt from liability when it acquires the security property.
Federal environmental laws, however, do not lend themselves to such
simple interpretation.
A careful analysis of CERCLA's express and implied objectives
reveals that Congress intended to exempt security interest holders only
while the security instrument is in force. Thus, a lender that acquires its
security property is a proper CERCLA defendant. This interpretation
finds support in the language and purpose of the exemption. Moreover,
such a construction treats potential CERCLA defendants equally and
upholds the statute's allocation of cleanup costs. A narrow construction
of the exemption provision also encourages lenders to police their secur-
ity properties. This result is consistent with other CERCLA provisions
that encourage private parties to involve themselves in safer waste prac-
tices. This function, however, may conflict with restrictions on a secured
party's involvement with its security. Therefore, the statute must be con-
strued to allow lenders to monitor and oversee the operation of security
properties to ensure compliance with state and federal environmental
laws. In this way, lenders can improve the security of their loans and
encourage safer disposal practices.
Scott Wilsdon*
187. See supra notes 17-19, 36-40, 52-57 and accompanying text.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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